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Standard search models are inconsistent with the amount of frictional wage dis-
persion found in U.S. data. We resolve this apparent puzzle by modeling skill
development (learning by doing on the job, skill loss during unemployment)
and duration dependence in unemployment bene￿ts in a random on the job
search model featuring two-sided heterogeneity. The model’s key parameters
are calibrated using micro data on employment mobility and wages from the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Our model is consistent
with the amount of frictional wage dispersion found in the data. Skill develop-
ment on the job is the most important driver behind this result. Meanwhile,
￿rm heterogeneity never accounts for more than 20% of overall wage inequality
within an age cohort.
Key Words: Frictional wage dispersion, Search model, Heterogeneity
JEL Classi￿cation: J24, J31, J64
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Alexander Kriwoluzky, Moritz Kuhn, Monika Merz, and Konstantinos Tatsiramos1 Introduction
Large residual wage variation among observationally identical workers is a pervasive
phenomenon in empirical studies of wage determination. In standard search models
of the labor market, we think of workers sampling job o￿ers from heterogeneous ￿rms
and a search friction prohibiting instantaneous matching. Refusing an o￿er entails
opportunity costs in the form of foregone wage earnings and the risk to be receiving
no o￿er next period. Hence, we would attribute wage dispersion not explained by
worker characteristics to these search frictions.
Meanwhile, as was recently pointed out by Hornstein et al. (2007) (HKV, hence-
forth), empirically observed frictional wage dispersion is far too large to be consistent
with standard speci￿cations of these models. Their estimate on U.S data would imply
optimal mean unemployment durations of twenty to thirty times the three months
we see in the data. In our view, this failing hints towards important other aspects of
the worker’s decision problem which have been neglected so far.
A number of well documented empirical facts stand out as candidates for re-
solving this apparent puzzle. First, employment carries additional bene￿ts such as
experience gains and unemployment additional costs such as skill losses which are
not captured by a standard search model. Second, if agents can e￿ciently search
for better job prospects while already in employment, accepting a job carries much
less ￿nality and this should make them more willing to enter into relatively poor
matches. Finally, there might be no puzzle after all and frictional wage dispersion
would just be an artefact of a misspeci￿ed reduced form estimation. For instance, if
worker characteristics have a strong stochastic and time varying component which
is unobservable to the econometrician this will cause a bias. Imperfect sorting of
worker types across ￿rms can have similar e￿ects.
The main contribution of our paper is to quantify the relative importance of the
above mentioned channels by calibrating a structural model to individual level data
on employment and wages. This approach allows us to account for endogenous worker
responses to obtain structural parameters. The size of frictional wage dispersion in
our model is compatible with the corresponding estimate from HKV. Finally, we
1can put frictional wage dispersion into the bigger picture of overall wage dispersion.
This allows us to address the long standing question of ￿rm versus worker e￿ects
in accounting for wage inequality. In our appendix, we also demonstrate that the
HKV estimator is successful in identifying the magnitude of frictional wage dispersion
even though our model speci￿cation would imply it to be biased. This rules out the
possibility that frictional wage dispersion is just a misidenti￿cation issue.
Summarizing our main ￿ndings, it turns out that the agents’ forward looking
behavior regarding their own productivity development on the job is the single most
important factor in explaining frictional wage dispersion. We also argue for the im-
portance of realistically modeling the e￿ciency of on the job search when trying to
asses its contribution to wage dispersion. As we demonstrate, an empirically perva-
sive phenomenon are job to job movements resulting in nominal wage losses, which
has large e￿ects on the implied search e￿ciencies. The contribution of skill losses
in unemployment and limited duration of unemployment bene￿ts is much smaller.
Nonetheless, it is only the combination of all factors that can explain empirically
observed residual wage dispersion.
Lastly, we ￿nd the contribution of frictional wage dispersion explained by ￿rm
heterogeneity to be modest. While it causes substantial wage di￿erences between
similar workers, it nonetheless never accounts for more than 20% of wage dispersion
within an age cohort and this share decreases as workers age. Instead, most of
wage inequality is attributable to initial worker characteristics. This ￿nding also
holds important implications for policy makers interested in reducing overall wage
inequality. A large contribution of ￿rm productivity dispersion would have suggested
that increasing search e￿ciencies might go a long way in compressing the wage
distribution. Instead, our results hint towards improvements in general education
and skill upgrades for older workers already in the workforce as more promising
routes to pursue.
Most closely related to our paper are two recent contributions by Burdett et al.
(2009) and Carrillo-Tudela (2010). The former generalize the Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) model1 by including labor market experience. Their goal is to show that the
1Mortensen (2003) shows that the basic Burdett Mortensen (1998) model with endogenous search
2model creates reasonable wage dispersion in the sense of HKV and an equilibrium
wage distribution with a fat right tail. Carrillo-Tudela (2010) extends this model
by introducing ￿rm heterogeneity and heterogeneity in job o￿er arrival rates for the
employed and the unemployed. Also related is a strand of literature which tries to
rationalize overall wage heterogeneity by on the job search models. Bontemps et al.
(1999) and Bontemps et al. (2000) set up on the job search models and structurally es-
timate them on French panel data. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) introduce worker
heterogeneity and use French linked employer-employee data for estimation. All of
the papers mentioned in this paragraph have in common that they attribute search
on the job a prominent role in explaining wage heterogeneity. In the light of our em-
pirical ￿ndings on the e￿ciency of on the job search, we think they might overstate
the importance of that channel.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: We present our model in
Section 2. Section 3 discusses our own empirical work and parametrization. Section
4 presents and analyzes our results. Section 5 concludes. Additional information on
the empirical part and the numerical algorithm is relegated to an appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 The Labor Market
A ￿rm is a match producing with the worker’s idiosyncratic log productivity At
and ￿rm speci￿c log productivity Γt
2. We assume that search is random and the
labor market is guided by matching function m = ξuιv1−ι where v are vacancies
and u are the unemployed. As usually, an unemployed worker contact rate q(θ)
and a job o￿er probability p(θ) can be derived from that matching function. Let
χ(At,Γt,φt) and ψ(At,φt,̟) be measures of employed and unemployed agents over
idiosyncratic productivity, ￿rm speci￿c productivity, the life-cycle state ( φ) and an
e￿ort implies implausible large monopsony power in wage posting when estimated on Danish data.
He advocates a bargaining wage approach instead, which is also our choice.
2Our model does not distinguish between ￿rm speci￿c productivity and match speci￿c produc-
tivity. We use the term ￿rm productivity, but actually mean the sum of the two.
3indicator for unemployment bene￿t entitlement ̟ in period t. Firm productivity
is drawn from the distribution F ∼ N(0,σ2
F). Once a match is formed it produces
output yt according to
yt = exp(At + Γt)
2.2 The Household Problem
Household period income is given by:
It(At,Γt,φt) =

   
   
wt(At,Γt,φt) if employed
b + Z if ̟ = u1
Z if ̟ = u2
b is the UI payment and Z is the leisure value of unemployment. If the agent is in
state u1 he receives UI, but with probability λl he looses the bene￿t entitlement and
moves to state u2. After match destruction, an agent is always entitled to bene￿ts 3.
In modeling productivity development we are guided by the ￿nding of Dustmann
and Meghir (2005), who show that the ￿rst two years of labor market experience
raise wages substantially (6-10% per year), while the return to experience is close to
zero afterwards (0-1.2%) 4. We therefore introduce a very stylized life cycle dimension
where agents transit through two life-cycle states (φ) with stochastic transition prob-
abilities p = (p1,p2). When the second shock hits, the agent dies and is reborn as
an unemployed labor market entrant in state u2 and with idiosyncratic productivity
drawn from the distribution N ∼ N( N,σ2
N).
The evolution of worker productivity depends on the agent’s employment status
3Low et al. (2010) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008) assume that entitlement is conditional on
the separation being a forced one. Our interpretation of productivity shocks is a di￿erent one from
theirs making this distinction not feasible.
4Dustmann and Meghir (2005) use German data, but have the advantage of identifying e￿ects
by using displaced workers. For US data, Altonji and Williams (1998) come to similar results.





max(At + ν(φ) + ǫt,pmin) if employed
max((1 − δ)At + ǫt,pmin) if unemployed
δ represents skill depreciation while being unemployed, pmin is a subsistence level
of productivity and ν(φ) is a drift term that depends on the life-cycle state. ǫ is a
productivity shock with ǫ ∼ N(0,σ2
ǫ). We think of wage shocks as anything altering
productivity such as demand shocks for speci￿c skills or health shocks. The fact that
net productivity growth can be negative means that our model also features wage
cuts on the job5.
Let ω be the exogenous match separation rate. Match shocks leave worker pro-
ductivity una￿ected but cause match dissolution. Examples can be demand shocks
or ￿nancing shocks to the ￿rm. Matches may also be dissolved endogenously as result
of a negative productivity innovation.
Our model allows employed workers to search for better job prospects, while being
employed. The ability to search on the job is one of the important potential channels
for generating frictional wage dispersion. The more e￿cient on the job search, the
less ￿nal is an accepted position and the higher the incentive to accept employment
at low productivity ￿rms. We follow Jolivet et al. (2006) in modeling some job to
job transitions as forced movements. One can think of such transitions occurring
due to family reasons, or being the result of mismeasurement in the data due to
time aggregation. An employed worker receives a job o￿er with probability λ and
can in general decide to stay with his old match, or form a new match. However,
when receiving an outside o￿er, with probability λd the o￿er is a forced movement
and the outside option, instead staying with the old match, is unemployment. In
our empirical section we show how we can infer the structural parameters λ and λd
from micro data on job transitions and wages.
At this point we need to make an assumption on how wage bargaining takes place.
5Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) argue show that this is an important empirical feature of wage
development.
5We assume ￿rms cannot commit to a wage path and each period wages are renego-
tiated by Nash-Bargaining. We assume a worker always quits into unemployment
before making a job to job transition, hence his outside option being unemploy-
ment with bene￿t entitlement when bargaining with the new ￿rm 6. Postel-Vinay
and Robin (2002) show that when ￿rms can commit to a wage path, transiting to a
higher productive match implies an option value, which can lead workers to accept an
initial wage cut. We rule out such behavior, because it appears not to be borne out
by the data. Recently, Flinn and Mabli (2008) show that standard Nash-Bargaining
￿ts key data moments better in an estimated DSGE model. In Appendix B.2.2 we
deliver some reduced form evidence that supports this point. We show that future
wage growth is uncorrelated to the initial wage cut accepted by workers, a statistic
clearly at odds with the idea of initial wage cuts being accepted because of an option
value7.
The timing within one model period is as follows:
• At the beginning of the period, the employed workers negotiate a wage with
their ￿rm and production takes place.
• End of period transitions occur. First, some unemployed transit from u1 to u2.
• The employed and unemployed experience productivity transitions according
to their laws of motion.
• Life cycle transitions take place. Agents die and are reborn.
• Exogenous job destruction occurs. Agents becoming unemployed cannot search
for employment within this period.
• On the job o￿ers realize.
• Employed agents decide whether to quit and the unemployed with job o￿ers
decide whether to accept the job.
6The same outside option would result when assuming the bargaining game from Moscarini
(2005) where the ￿rms enter into an auction for the worker.
7Moreover, Mortensen (2003) also criticizes the mechanism outlined by Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2002), arguing that it seems infeasible in many circumstances.
6We can thus de￿ne the value of employment for each life-cycle state (V E
φ ) and the
value of unemployment (V U
φ,̟) depending on worker’s idiosyncratic productivity, ￿rm
productivity, and bene￿t entitlement. We state the Bellman equations describing the
problems of agents in the ￿rst life-cycle state as an example. The value of employment
is the ￿xed point to:
V
E
1 (At,Γt) = wt(At,Γt,1) + βEt{(1 − ω)
[(1 − p1)[(1 − λ)H(1) + λ[(1 − λd)ΩE(1) + λdΛ(1)]]
+ p1[(1 − λ)H(2) + λ[(1 − λd)ΩE(2) + λdΛ(2)]]]





Furthermore, there are two value functions for the unemployed with and without




1,u1(At) = b + Z + βEt{(1 − λl)
[(1 − p1)[p(θ)ΩU(1,u1) + (1 − p(θ))V
U
1,u1(At+1)]
+ p1[p(θ)ΩU(2,u1) + (1 − p(θ))V
U
2,u1(At+1)]]
+ λl[(1 − p1)[p(θ)ΩU(1,u2) + (1 − p(θ))V
U
1,u2(At+1)]
+ p1[p(θ)ΩU(2,u2) + (1 − p(θ))V
U
2,u2(At+1)]]}




1,u2(At) = Z + βEt{(1 − p1)[p(θ)ΩU(1,u2) + (1 − p(θ))V
U
1,u2(At+1)]
+ p1[p(θ)ΩU(2,u2) + (1 − p(θ))V
U
2,u2(At+1)]}
Et is the expectation operator given all information in period t. For clarity of pre-
sentation, we have de￿ned the following auxiliary variables: ΩE(x) and ΩU(x,̟)
are the expected values of receiving a job o￿er for the employed and unemployed
7conditional on life-cycle state and bene￿t entitlement. H(x) represents the decision






























Note, that frictional wage dispersion is created by the dispersion of the ￿rm speci￿c
productivity distribution F. Moreover, observe that future values of employment
and unemployment depend on the future idiosyncratic states. This forward looking
behavior of the rational agent makes unemployment a less desirable state.
2.3 The Firm Problem
An entering ￿rm’s problem is described by its value to post a vacancy (V I). An open
vacancy entails ￿ow costs of ϕ each period. We assume vacancies are homogeneous ex
ante and the realization of the idiosyncratic productivity reveals only upon meeting
a worker and entering into wage negotiations. If a worker is contacted, Γ is drawn
from F 8. There are three ways to ￿ll a vacancy. First, an unemployed agent might be
contacted, occurring with probability q(θ). Second, the ￿rm might headhunt a worker
that is employed and make him a job o￿er, which happens at rate
λ(1−λd)
v . Or third, a
worker might be o￿ered the vacancy by a forced job movement, occurring at rate
λλd
v .
Note that in any case the ex ante acceptance probability depends on the productivity
of the vacancy. Given that ￿rm and worker productivities are complements, higher
productivity vacancies attract also lower productivity workers and are less likely to
lose parts of their workforce to other ￿rms. We relegate the further description of
8This can be rationalized by assuming that there is a match speci￿c component in productivity.
This is also the assumption made by Yamaguchi (2010).
8(V I) to Appendix A as it provides little additional intuition.
The value of a ￿lled vacancy V J
x depends on the life-cycle state of the matched
employee and a ￿rm employing someone in life-cycle state 1 has value
V
J
1 (At,Γt) = yt − w(At,Γt,1) + β(1 − ω)Et{
(1 − λ)[(1 − p1)Φ(1) + p1Φ(2)]
+ λ(1 − λd)η(Γt+1)[(1 − p1)Φ(1) + p1Φ(2)]}
where η(Γ) is the probability that the worker stays with the ￿rm when contacted from
an outside ￿rm, which is increasing in Γ. Moreover, we have de￿ned the auxiliary






A stationary equilibrium consists of
• Value functions for the employed, unemployed and the ￿rm value.






x,u1) + (1 − α)log(V
J
x )}
where α is the bargaining power of workers and we made use of the fact that
the value of a vacancy is zero.
• A policy function that is consistent with the value functions and that maps
worker productivity, ￿rm productivity, bene￿t entitlement, and the life-cycle
state into a decision, whether a match is formed or not.
9• Stationary distributions of the employed and unemployed over worker produc-
tivities, employment states, life cycle states, bene￿t entitlement states and ￿rm
productivities.
For a better understanding of the model, Figure I presents the equilibrium policy
functions for workers with bene￿t entitlement. In the black area, match formation
would yield negative surplus. In the white area all matches are formed and in the
gray area match formation depends on the life-cycle of workers. Firms with low pro-
ductivity only match up with workers of high idiosyncratic productivity. Therefore,
the out￿ow rates for workers with high productivity are larger than for those with
low productivities. The pro￿le for workers in the ￿rst life-cycle is strictly below the
pro￿le of workers in the second life-cycle, representing their additional gains from
taking up employment.
Figure I: Worker policy functions
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  = 1
Notes: The graph displays the policy functions. In the black area, no matches are formed. In the gray area, match
formation depends on the life-cycle of the worker and in the white area all matches are formed.
2.5 Approximating the Wage Schedule
To facilitate our subsequent analysis and to make our approach more comparable
to standard microeconometric speci￿cations we approximate the equilibrium wage
10schedule by a linear function. From the Nash-bargaining solution it is obvious that
log wages are not a linear function in worker and ￿rm productivity. Figures II and III
plot ln(w) over worker and ￿rm productivity for agents in life-cycle state 2, holding
the productivity of the other ￿xed at its mean value. The plots indicate that these
functions can still be reasonably well approximated by a linear function. We asses
this more formally by ￿tting a linear OLS regression to an economy generated by
the true non-linear dynamics of our model. To be more speci￿c, we simulate 50000
workers for 2 years from the stationary distribution, using our non-linear model. We
then project the resulting data into a linear space employing the following regression:
ln(wi,t) = β0 + β1Ai,t + β2φi,t + β3Γi,t + ai,t (1)
Note, assuming the law of large number holds, the error term ai,t measures the
approximation error that results from the linear projection. Success is interpreted
as getting predicted wages that are close to the actual wages. R2 is above 0.996,
suggesting that the ￿t of the linear regression model is quite well. Hence, we continue
to work from now on with the linear approximation (1) to our true non-linear model.
Figure II:
Log wages over individual productivity















Notes: The graph displays the equilibrium log wage
schedule, holding ￿rm productivity and its median
level and the life-cycle state ￿xed. The ￿rst 95% of
all workers employed at such matches are within the
dashed bounds.
Figure III:
Log wages over ￿rm productivity













Notes: The graph displays the equilibrium log wage
schedule, holding worker productivity and the
life-cycle state ￿xed.
113 Parametrization
We take a dual strategy in assigning parameter values to our model. For a number
of parameter values we take numbers from other studies. This allows us to make
our results easily comparable. Also, for many of those parameters (discount factor
and bargaining share, for example) our results are robust to variations. We will
come back to this point below. The particular focus of our paper requires us to take
great care in calibrating worker and ￿rm productivity uncertainty and ￿ow rates in
and out of employment and between ￿rms. Wherever possible, we therefore esti-
mate our calibration targets for the related parameters using a single data set in
order to insure consistency. The data set best suited for our analysis is the Survey
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) which is a representative panel of the
non-institutionalized US civilian population. Although the SIPP provides very de-
tailed and extensive coverage, we cannot estimate all of the productivity parameters
on the basis of our data set. We therefore take additional information from other
micro studies carefully discussing each of our choices. This section proceeds as fol-
lows: We ￿rst introduce the SIPP and explain sample selection. We then discuss our
calibration regarding non-distributional parameters (preferences, institutions, ￿ow
rates). Finally, we discuss productivity distributions and how we estimate idiosyn-
cratic and ￿rm productivity uncertainty. Our calibration is summarized in Table 1.
Some additional information regarding our data work is given in Appendix B.
3.1 Data Source and Sample Creation
Our empirical analysis aims to accurately identify job-to-job transitions and ac-
companying wage changes as well as wage dynamics on the job. We therefore re-
quire longitudinal monthly wage information which identify employer and occupation
changes. The data set which best meets these requirements is the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP). The SIPP is a representative sample of the non-
institutionalized civilian US population maintained by the US Census Bureau. Its
main goal is to track income dynamics and welfare program participation of house-
holds and individuals. The level of detail it provides in individual records allows us
12to accurately identify an individual’s main job and hourly wages on that job.
In our analysis, we use the 1993 cohort from the SIPP which covers the years
1993-1995 (which also includes some observations from 1992) 9. During that time,
an individual completes at most 9 interviews. We use observations from individuals
aged 16-70 for which we require complete information for the period of the interview
on the individual’s employment status, age and employer id. On top of that, we only
consider an individual’s primary job10. These restrictions leave us with 1,084,679
person/month observations.
The SIPP is a collection of panels of which a new one starts every year. In con-
structing the panels, the Census Bureau randomly assigns people to rotation groups
which are then interviewed subsequently on a four-month basis. One completed ro-
tation is called a wave. During the interviews, the respondents give information on
their labor market status for each week in the past four months separately which is
then used to assign one of eight possible activity statuses. While this form of report-
ing allows for a very precise labor market classi￿cation it also constitutes one of the
sample’s few drawbacks. Not only is it very hard to compare unemployment mea-
sures based on this classi￿cation to those based on other more widely used ones like
for instance the ones in the Current Population Survey (CPS). It has also been shown
to downward bias estimates of transition ￿ows between employment and unemploy-
ment11. Because of these well known biases, we use estimates from corresponding
CPS cohorts. Both panels are representative samples from the same population and
so this should be unproblematic.
3.2 Non-Distributional Parameters
Model period is one month. The length of a period is of importance, because it puts
an upper bound on the job o￿er probability p(θ) and the minimum duration of an
9We use the CEPR SIPP extracts available for download at
http://www.ceprdata.org/sipp/sipp_data.php .
10As primary job we consider the position where the largest share of hours worked is spent.
11See Mazumder (2007) for a discussion.
13unemployment spell. The ￿rst point is well supported by the data 12, but the second
constraint is likely to be binding13.
We calculate the EU and UE rate of the US non-institutionalized population
from CPS data for the years 1994-1995 following Fallick and Fleischmann (2004)
for reasons discussed above. The exogenous job destruction rate is set such that
the total destruction rate d, the sum of endogenous and exogenous movements from
employment to unemployment, is 1.43% per month. We attach to ξ a value that
implies a monthly job ￿nding rate of 0.271.
We can use SIPP data to calibrate the parameters guiding on the job search.
Information on EE movements and wage changes identify λ and λd. We adjust λ to
imply that 2.51% of workers switch employers every period. As discussed previously,
in order to correctly model the e￿ciency of on the job search, it is important to
know how many of these movements result in wage improvements. Our identifying
assumption for telling voluntary and involuntary movements apart is that voluntary
movements always result in wage increases. In our data set, 33% of all EE movements
result in a nominal wage loss. We set the percentage of forced movements ( λd) to 0.41
to match this statistic. In Appendix B, we provide further details on our identi￿cation
of EE movements. We also supply additional evidence that wage cuts after job to
job movements are a pervasive phenomenon in all subgroups of the population.
There is a large debate on the appropriate values of α, ι and θ, because of their
importance for business-cycle ￿uctuations. Fortunately, in our stationary distribu-
tion analysis these parameters do not a￿ect our results, because they only a￿ect the
job ￿nding rate. Therefore, changing the parameters leads only to a recalibration of
ξ. Hence, we normalize α = ι = 0.5 and use ϕ to match a labor market tightness of
12Holzer (1988) reports based on NLSY data that in the previous month 34% of the unemployed
received at least one job o￿er and 12% received more than one o￿er. We are therefore con￿dent
that on average the unemployed worker does not receive more than one job o￿er per month.
13Clark and Summers (1979) report that based on the CPS 60% of all unemployed spells end
within one month, while at any point in time, 69% of all unemployed have been out of a job for two
months or more. These two ￿gures can only coincide when a considerable fraction of unemployment
spells end within less than one month. Therefore, our model cannot by construction match the high
out￿ow rates within the ￿rst month. However, time disaggregation below one month is rather costly,
because our numerical algorithm uses value function iteration which converges at a rate of 1 − β.
140.6, which is the estimate by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
Consistent with ￿ndings from Siegel (2002) for average bond and stock returns,
we set β to imply a yearly interest rate of 4%. Next, we consider the ￿ow value of
unemployment. We choose unemployment bene￿ts (b) to target a replacement rate
of 25% of the mean wage14. As argued in Hall and Milgrom (2008) this provides
an parsimonious describtion of the system. The same source suggests a value of
leisure (Z) of 46% of the median wage which is inferred from micro consumption
data. HKV claim that the random matching model does not permit frictional wage
dispersion close to those observed in the data for any positive replacement rates. In
total, our calibration implies a replacement rate of 71% of the median wage, which
is substantial. Last, we ￿x the probability for an unemployed worker to loose his
bene￿t entitlement such that average bene￿t entitlement is six months, which is the
standard length in the US system outside of economic crisis.
In the presence of tenure and selection e￿ects, it would be very hard (and poten-
tially produce unreliable results) to estimate mean experience gains from our data
set. We therefore use life-cycle transition rates and drift terms in productivity during
employment to match statistics found by Dustmann and Meghir (2005). Productivity
is assumed to grow at an annual rate of 8% when employed during the ￿rst life-cycle
state and at a rate of 1% during the second. The transition probability between life
cycle states (p) is set such that agents spend on average 24 months in the ￿rst state
and 480 in the second. Following Olivetti (2006), an unemployed worker experiences
2% skill depreciation per year15. The subsistence level of log-productivity (pmin)
is normalized to zero, as it does not carry any additional information that is not
contained in the distribution of initial productivities.
Getting the life-cycle properties of productivity development right is of particular
importance given the focus of our paper. We therefore compare additional non-
14This way of modeling UI implies that the e￿ective replacement rate for low wage earners is
much higher than for high wage earners. This is also true in the data, because the UI system has
both an upper and lower bound. Yet, our model is likely to overstate this e￿ect. Still, we opt not
to correct for it as we believe it to be reasonably small and in order to keep the dimension of the
state space tractable.
15This is also in line with Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008), who impose that skill depreciation is
twice the rate of skill accumulation.
15targeted reduced form moments that are functions of the above parameters in our
model and the data. Average workers’ wage gains over time are informative about
the validity of our experience pro￿le and the on the job search behavior of workers.
We have to rely to outside estimations for this statistic, because we do not observe
workers su￿ciently long in our data. Topel and Ward (1992) estimate that after
10 years of potential experience, US male workers have experienced wage gains of
about 50%. Because their paper uses a di￿erent sample from another tim period and
because we neglect other possibly important drivers of wages, one would not expect
the model to match this statistic perfectly. Nevertheless, the model yields quite a
good ￿t to this statistic (56% average wage growth).
3.3 Distributional Parameters
We now describe the way we estimate the variance of idiosyncratic productivity
shocks σ2
ǫ and ￿rm productivity dispersion σ2
F. Neither statistic is directly observable
in the data because of measurement error. Additionally, agents endogenously select
themselves into and out of employment and into employment with ￿rms of speci￿c
productivity levels in response to idiosyncratic productivity developments. Instead,
we identify them as follows: We derive a model statistic that is an (unknown) function
of σ2
ǫ and σ2
F respectively. Taking our model to be the data generating process, we
estimate the same statistic in our data controlling for measurement error. We can
then adjust our model parameter until the identifying moment matches the empirical
estimate.
3.3.1 Measuring Idiosyncratic Productivity Uncertainty
Remember equation (1), our linearized approximation to the wage function:
ln(wi,t) = β0 + β1Ai,t + β2φi,t + β3Γi,t + ai,t
Next, consider ∆ln(ww
i,t), the change in log wages of workers being employed with the
same employer in two consecutive months. Endogenous responses to productivity
16shocks (workers quitting after bad productivity shocks) implies that we will only
observe a self selected subgroup of ∆ln(ww
i,t) every period. However, we do not have
to control for this e￿ect explicitly, because it is present both in our model and in the
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ǫobs follows a distribution of unknown functional form. It is, however, an object
which we observe in the data and whose moments we can use to identify σ2
ǫ in our
model. Regressing out the constant from (2), we can calculate the resulting prediction
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Turning to our SIPP data, we assume that wages are generated by:
ln(wi,t) = α0 + α1dt + α2Zi,t + β2Γi + ei,t
where dt captures aggregate states, such as TFP and Zi,t is a vector of idiosyncratic
components. We split the unobservable ei,t into two parts:
ei,t = ri,t + β1Ai,t
As in the model, Ai,t is assumed to follow a random walk with drift while ri,t captures
measurement error. Following Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), we assume measurement
error to follow an MA(q) process (i.e. ri,t = Θ(q)ιi,t = ιi,t−
 q
j=1 θjιi,t−j). Analogous
to before, we work with the observed wage process wobs
i,t .
We ￿rst regress log-di￿erences in observed within-￿rm wages on a constant, a
period dummy to control for business cycle e￿ects, an industry dummy 16, a month
dummy to control for seasonality and an interaction between the industry and month
16We use the 23 major industry classi￿cation system.
17dummy to control for month speci￿c industry e￿ects such as collective bargaining.
Again, we call the corresponding residuals of this regression ∆ln( ˆ wobs
i,t ). In order to
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Our model economy indicates almost no endogenous quits and so we think this
assumption not overly restrictive. Following Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), we can













Given that studies on annual wage growth typically assume iid measurement error,
we ￿x q at 12. Finally, we adjust σ2
ǫ in our model economy, until (3) and (4) coincide.
All endogenous sorting that causes the observed productivity distribution in the data
to di￿er from the true one is also present in our model.
3.3.2 Measuring Firm Productivity Dispersion
Using wage changes from workers experiencing a job to job transition, we use a similar
identi￿cation strategy as before to identify ￿rm productivity dispersion. De￿ne the
change in log wages of individual i after a job to job transition as
bi,t = ln(wi,t) − ln(wi,t−1)












i is the productivity of the current employer and Γobs
i,−1 is the productivity of
the previous one. We can now identify ￿rm productivity dispersion via the excess























Under the assumption that measurement error for job movers is not more severe
than for job stayers17 and after again controlling for industry and time e￿ects, we
can construct the same statistic in our data and use it to match ￿rm productivity
dispersion. Again, we are con￿dent that our estimation provides a good ￿t to the
data. A worker who switches employer on average experiences a wage gain of 2.8%
which looks good compared to the model estimate of 3.1%.
3.3.3 Initial Worker Productivities
Finally, we have to calibrate the distribution of initial productivities for which we
assume normality. Without matched employer-employee data it is not possible to
separately identify the variance of initial individual productivities σ2
N. We take this
value from Woodcock (2008), who estimates it to be 0.2 based on an US linked
employer-employee data set18. The mean of the distribution of initial productivi-
ties carries information about the unemployment duration distribution, once pmin
is ￿xed. However, the e￿ect turns out to be extremely small for our calibration.
Changing the mean productivity from 1.9 to 3.5 changes the fraction of unemployed
with a spell of one month or less by only 0.005. It leaves the fraction of unemployed
who endogenously quit after a bad productivity shock virtually unchanged 19. Hence,
we ￿x  N at 2.
17As discussed previously, we are excluding those individuals who are holding multiple jobs after
a transition to rule out this source of additional reporting error. We have also constructed three-
month-averages of wages after a movement to mitigate other sources of reporting error in the
following the transition. This, however, did not a￿ect our estimates.
18As we do, he treats initial ability as a random variable and estimates the variance by a random
e￿ect model. Storesletten et al. (2004) come to practically identical results.
19The reason is that increasing the mean productivity level increases equilibrium wages almost
proportionally. This leads to an increase in unemployment bene￿ts to keep the replacement rate
constant and therefore the threshold levels for hiring move almost proportionally out.
19Table 1: Calibration
Variable Target
β = 0.9967 4% yearly interest rate
ϕ = 62.5 θ = 0.6
α = ι = 0.5 Normalization
b = 2.195 b
wmean = 25%
Z = 4.04 Z
wmean = 46%
λl = 0.16 6 month bene￿t duration
ω = 0.0142 d = 0.0143
ξ = 0.37 UE ￿ow of 0.271
λ = 0.0413 EE ￿ow of 0.0251
λd = 0.405 33.3% of EE are forced
ν(1) = 0.0067 8% yearly productivity growth
ν(2) = 0.00083 1% yearly productivity growth
p1 = 0.04 2 years in 1st life-cycle
p2 = 0.002 40 years in 2nd life-cycle
δ = 0.00167 2% yearly skill depreciation
pmin = 0 Normalization
σǫ = 0.0547 Equation (4)=0.0022
σF = 0.147 Equation (5)=0.051
σN = 0.445 -
 N = 2 Normalization
Notes: The ￿rst column states the calibrated variable and the value, the second states the target, and the third
states the source. SIPP refers to the 1993 Survey of Income Program Participants and CPS refers to the 1994-1995
Current Population Survey.
4 Results
We now present the main results of our paper. First, we demonstrate that our model
is successful in generating frictional wage dispersion of the size suggested by HKV.
We then show that the forward looking behavior of agents with respect to skill de-
velopment and bene￿t duration and the ability of on the job search are both of key
importance to understand why identical workers accept very di￿erent wages. We
demonstrate that skill development while being employed is the single most impor-
tant factor that drives a wedge between the value of employment and unemployment.
20An important related result is that ignoring the possibility of forced movements and
inferring on the job search e￿ciency only from observed job to job movements leads
to an implausibly high contacting rate and misleading interpretation of the results.
We then turn to the second main contribution of our paper. Having identi￿ed ￿rm
dispersion, productivity development and the distribution of workers over ￿rms we
can reassess the importance of each of these factors for overall wage inequality. Our
results indicate that about 90% of wage inequality is explained by dispersion in
worker productivities.
4.1 Frictional Wage Dispersion
Table 2: Frictional Wage Dispersion
Percentile Model Hornstein et al. (2007)




Notes: The table displays the simulated mean-min ratios from our baseline model and the measure reported by
Hornstein et al. (2007) based on PSID data. The minimum wage is measured as the absolute minimum, at the 1st
percentile, the 5th percentile and the 10th percentile respectively of the frictional wage distribution respectively.
HKV suggest to measure frictional wage dispersion by looking at the predicted
ratio of the mean to the minimum wage. As minimum wage they try out the 1st,
5th and 10th percentile of the frictional wage distribution respectively 20. They esti-
mate this ratio from di￿erent sources of US data and ￿nd a plausible range between
1.32 and 3.11 with their favorite estimate being around 1.7. This estimate controls
for worker productivity by a ￿xed e￿ect regression, which includes observable time
varying worker characteristics as further controls. We evaluate success of our model
by its ability to generate a sizable mean to min ration in wages net of worker e￿ects.
20The authors reason that the reported absolute minimum wage is likely to be too small, due to
reporting errors and they try to correct for this by looking at percentiles.
21We argue in Appendix C that their estimator is likely to be upward biased, due to
stochastic productivity. We use our structural model to asses the size of the bias and
show it to be small.
Our model has no algebraic solution to this statistic, we therefore use (1) to
compute
ln( ˆ wi,t) = β3Γi,t
After transforming log predicted wages ln( ˆ wi,t) back to their level, we compute the
ratio of mean to minimum frictional wage. The results are displayed in Table 2. The
results vary with the percentile considered, but they clearly indicate that the model
creates sizable frictional wage dispersion in the range suggested by HKV 21. More
speci￿c, the model predicts that the observed median wage is 2.06 times the minimum
wage of exactly identical workers, which is well supported by their estimates given
their argument that the data contains additional noise.
4.1.1 Explaining the Drivers of Frictional Wage Dispersion
We now turn to evaluate the sources of frictional wage dispersion in our model
and their relative importance. We evaluate the role of forward looking behavior by
the agents and the role of on the job search consecutively. In each experiment we
recalibrate the model such that the ￿ow rates and the ￿ow value of unemployment
remain as in our baseline model.
In Table 3 we solve di￿erent versions of our model speci￿cation subsequently
excluding skill depreciation in unemployment, learning on the job and ￿nite duration
of unemployment bene￿ts. It turns out that skill accumulation on the job is the
single most important factor that drives a wedge between the value of employment
and unemployment. The large average on the job wage growth that we observe in
the data greatly ampli￿es the value of employment compared to non-employment.
As potential experience gains are equal in all ￿rms, being employed at all becomes
the crucial. The same argument applies to skill depreciation in unemployment. Even
21As a robustness check whether our estimator is able to ￿lter out individual e￿ects, we resolve
the model and simulate it for a lower value of the variance of initial productivities. The computed
mean min ratio is indeed the same.
22though its e￿ect is smaller than the e￿ect of skill accumulation on the job, it turns
out to be an important feature in understanding why agents accept relatively low
reservation wages at job entry. The introduction of ￿nite unemployment bene￿ts has
the smallest e￿ect.
Table 3: Contributions to Frictional Wage Dispersion
Speci￿cation FWD
No skill depreciation
(δ = 0) 1.83
No learning on the job
(ν(φ) = 0) 1.15
In￿nite UI
(λl = 0) 1.96
Notes: The table displays the frictional wage dispersion (FWD) for four di￿erent model speci￿cations that di￿er
from our baseline model by one parameter restriction.
Table 4 presents job o￿er probabilities for the employed and the resulting fric-
tional wage dispersion for di￿erent assumptions about on the job search. Consider
￿rst a model which replicates empirical EE ￿ow sizes but neglects that some tran-
sitions are followed by wage cuts. In such a setting, the imputed job o￿er arrival
rate on the job increases by a factor of 17 compared to our baseline speci￿cation.
Going back to our baseline speci￿cation, this means that workers are a less selective
when receiving on the job o￿ers in the presence of force movements. There are two
reasons for this. First, if a job o￿er is a forced one, moving is almost always preferred
to quitting into unemployment. Second, forced job movements decrease the rate at
which agents climb up the productivity latter of ￿rms, making future job o￿ers more
likely to be better than today’s o￿er. Therefore, search on the job is less e￿cient in
a model featuring forced job movements. Hence, the value of employment decreases
relative to the value of unemployment, which again decreases frictional wage disper-
sion. In total, the model without forced job movements predicts a mean to min ratio
of 4.85, which would largely overstate frictional wage dispersion given realistic values
for other parameters.
23This is not to say that on the job search has no important role. The bottom panel
of Table 4 illustrates this point. Once we disallow all on the job search, agents do not
accept low productive jobs anymore and our measure of frictional wage dispersion
falls well below its empirical counterpart. This is despite the presence of our skill
accumulation processes and ￿nite UI payments. In the end, only the combination
of all e￿ects allows us to replicate empirically observed frictional wage dispersion.
So it is a combination of e￿ects that makes both unemployment less attractive (in
an absolute sense) and employment more attractive compared to a standard search
model.
Table 4: Frictional Wage Dispersion and On the Job Search
Speci￿cation λ FWD
No forced movements
(λd = 0) 0.71 4.85
No on the job search
(λ = 0) 0 1.1
Notes: The table displays the job o￿er probability on the job for two di￿erent model speci￿cations and the
resulting frictional wage dispersion (FWD) measured at the minimum of the frictional wage dispersion.
4.2 Wage Dispersion
In this ￿nal section, having established that our model reproduces empirically rea-
sonable amounts of frictional wage dispersion, we want to assess its contribution to
overall wage dispersion. The answer to this question has important implications for
policymakers interested in reducing overall wage dispersion. If search frictions, mani-
fested in productivity dispersion of ￿rms and sorting of workers over ￿rm types, were
the main driver of wage inequality, policies should be aimed at increasing matching
e￿ciency. If, however, worker heterogeneity either in the form of di￿ering initial abil-
ities or of heterogenous employment histories are the main drivers of wage dispersion,
little e￿cieny and equity gains can be expected from such policies. Measures aimed
24at improving general education or aimed at skill updating for workers already in the
labor force can then be expected to be far more bene￿cial.
In order to assure that our model can be used to make such statements, we ￿rst
have to assure that it reproduces a wage distribution comparable to what we see in
the data. Whereas our results presented so far were mainly just dependent on a good
identi￿cation of σF, a good identi￿cation of σǫ and σN is now of crucial importance
as well. Our results regarding the overall wage distribution are reassuring and allow
us to proceed. We then construct a simple variance decomposition to asses the
contribution of search frictions to overall wage dispersion over the life cycle. We ￿nd
that frictions can only explain a very moderate amount of wage dispersion. Their
contribution never exceeds 20% and is decreasing in worker’s age. These results favor
education and training as policies to overcome wage hetergeneity.
4.2.1 Overall Wage Dispersion in the Model and in the Data
Figure IV plots the kernel estimator of the aggregate density function of wages 22. It
features the characteristic right skew of the observed wage distribution in the data.
We compute the coe￿cient of variation and the coe￿cient of excess kurtosis to be
able to compare the theoretical distribution with the empirical distribution. The
coe￿cient of variation and excess kurtosis in the model are 0.63 and 8.6, compared
to 0.59 and 7.04 in the data, respectively.
Figure V displays the theoretical and empirical Lorenz curves of wages. Our
model economy exhibits slightly more wage inequality, but the di￿erence is negligible.
Overall, the results make us con￿dent that our model economy picks up the key
moments of wage inequality present in the data.
22We truncate our observed wage data at the bottom and top 1% wage observations to delete
outliers. We do the same adjustment to our simulated data in this section.
25Figure IV:
The Wage Distribution




























Notes: The Figure displays the the theoretical PDF
of workers over wages, smoothed with a kernel
estimator.
Figure V:
Empirical and Theoretical Lorenz Curve






































Notes: The straight line is the Lorenz curve of wages
in SIPP data. The dashed line is the Lorenz curve
from the theoretical model.
4.2.2 The Contribution of Frictional Wage Dispersion to overall Wage
Dispersion
In this section we evaluate to what degree wage dispersion results from workers’
productivity di￿erences, ￿rm di￿erences, and worker selection into matches. For this
purpose we simulate a panel of 10000 workers’ histories for 16 years. Consider the
following variance decomposition based on a slightly modi￿ed version of (1), which
we estimate separately for each age cohort in our simulated data 23
V ar(ln(wi)) = β
2
1V ar(Ai) + β
2
2V ar(Γi) + 2β1β2Cov(Ai,Γi)
Figure VI displays the results. Sorting of worker to ￿rm productivities has a
mild negative e￿ect. Moreover, already for labor market entrants ￿rm heterogeneity
explains only about 20 percent of overall log wage variance 24. Our model identi￿es
worker heterogeneity as the dominant factor in explaining variations in wages and
this e￿ect is increasing in age.
23The mean R2 of all regressions is 0.99, giving us con￿dence that the approximation works ￿ne.
24Abowd et al. (1999a) ￿nd for the state of Washington that ￿rm e￿ects explain around 24% of
the variance in log wages. However, Abowd et al. (1999b) ￿nd much lower ￿rm e￿ects for France.
Our estimates are somewhat in between these studies.
26Note, that our ￿nding that individual worker heterogeneity is the main driver of
aggregate wage dispersion is not in contrast to the fact that a Mincer wage equation
with worker ￿xed e￿ects usually explains only little variation in wages. Individ-
ual productivity is only partially correlated to initial productivity 25 and all changes
in productivity are time varying unobservables to the econometrician. The typi-
cal worker observables included in the Mincer wage equation can at best proxy for
these variations. Also note, that our ￿nding is perfectly in line with Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2010), who use time series evidence to show that search frictions explain
little of overall wage dispersion.
Figure VI: Contribution of Search Friction to Overall Wage Dispersion










































Notes: The graph displays the contribution of sorting (dark gray area), ￿rm e￿ects (medium gray area) and worker
e￿ects (light gray area) on the variance of log wages, conditional on age.
5 Conclusions
Search theory emphasizes that identical workers can earn di￿erent wages in the mar-
ket due to dispersion in ￿rm payment schemes. However, Hornstein et al. (2007)
25The correlation between the initial ability and productivity after 16 years of labor market
experience is 0.46 in our simulation.
27show that the empirically observed size of these di￿erences is too large to be consis-
tent with observed worker ￿ows within the usually applied model speci￿cations. The
high observed out￿ow rate from unemployment suggests that standard speci￿cations
overstate the bene￿ts from additional search.
In our paper, we resolve this apparent puzzle by modeling skill development
(learning by doing on the job, skill loss during unemployment) and duration de-
pendence in unemployment bene￿ts in a random on the job search model featuring
two-sided heterogeneity. We demonstrate how to identify structural parameters of
our model using data on job mobility and wages from the SIPP. Our expanded
search model is successful in jointly generating frictional wage dispersion of the size
suggested by the data and high out￿ow rates from unemployment.
The most important mechanism behind our results is experience gains during
employment. It should be stressed, however, that only the joint presence of all the
channels allows the model to successfully replicate the empirical amount of frictional
wage dispersion. Another important result concerns the modeling of on the job
search. The data suggest that around 1/3 of all observed job to job transitions
result in nominal wage cuts. We argue, hence, that infering search e￿ciencies from
a basic job ladder modell where all job movements are the result of optimal choices
overstates the e￿ciency of on the job search.
Having identi￿ed the sources and size of frictional wage dispersion, we can asses
its importance for overall wage inequality. Our model assigns less than 10 percent of
overall wage dispersion to dispersion of ￿rm productivities - a very modest contribu-
tion. Instead, large dispersion in worker skills at labor market entry drive large parts
of the dispersion. This suggests that, although ￿rm productivity dispersion can cause
substantial wage di￿erences between workers of identical capabilities, the e￿ects of
e￿ciency gains in search on overall wage inequality are likely to be small. Hence,
we stress that to reduce wage inequlity the emphasis must be on factors in￿uencing
skill dispersion instead of increasing labor market search e￿ciencies.
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31A The Value of a Vacancy
Here we supply the calculation of vacancy value which for reasons of parsimony we
excluded from the main text. To evaluate future pro￿t prospects and acceptance
probabilities, the entrepreneur needs to know the stationary distributions of the un-
employed over productivity, bene￿t states and life-cycle states, which has density
f(ψ). Moreover, he needs to know the distribution of workers over their productiv-
ities, life-cycle states and other ￿rms’ productivities, which has density f(χ). Sum-
marizing the workers’ states in s = (A,Γ,φ), the value of posting a vacancy (V I) is
the expectation of ￿rm value V J
x over productivity and life-cycle states, minus the
vacancy posting costs ϕ:
V
I = −ϕ + βEt{q(θ)[























where q1,q2,q3 are the probabilities that a worker will accept the job o￿er given that
he is of type A and in life-cycle φ and the ￿rm is of type Γ. These probabilities are
strictly increasing in Γ, as a more productive ￿rm ￿nds it easier to attract workers.
Note, we set the continuation value of a vacancy to zero, which is true in equilibrium,
because of free entry into the market.
B More on the empirics of on the job search
B.1 Measuring job to job employment ￿ows
In order to asses the e￿ciency of search on the job, it is crucial to accurately identify
job to job transitions in the data. One of the biggest advantages in working with
SIPP data is that workers are asked to report an employment status for each week of
the reporting period separately. While a higher degree of time aggregation may mask
32intermittent unemployment spells, we can identify any unemployment spell lasting
longer than one work week.
In a given month we count as employed someone who reports holding a job
for the entire month. This de￿nition includes paid as well as unpaid absences as
result of vacations, illnesses or labor disputes. It does exclude, however, those who
report having been on layo￿ for at least a week. There is no standard de￿nition
for job to job movements in empirical work. We therefore experiment with several
di￿erent de￿nitions. Our ￿rst measure is analogous to the de￿nition in Fallick and
Fleischman (2004) and equates job to job transitions with ￿rm changes. We use
a monthly employer identi￿er based on company names created by Stinson (2003).
We refer to this de￿nition by EE1. Given that a ￿rm is a match in our model
and given that employers may transit between jobs within a given ￿rm, it might be
useful to somewhat broaden the concept beyond employer id changes. For EE2 we
therefore follow Moscarini and Thomsson (2007) in identifying job to job movements
by changes in the three digit occupational code. Moreover, we de￿ne EE3 = EE1∪
EE2 and EE4 = EE1 ∩ EE2.
Table 5: EE ￿ow rates based on di￿erent de￿nitions
EE1 EE2 EE3 EE4 CPS
1.93 1.77 2.51 1.19 2.82
Notes: The Table shows percentage probabilities for worker job to job transitions from SIPP data from end of 1992
to 1995. For reference we also quote monthly averages from Fallick and Fleischmann (2004) for the years 1994-1995.
The di￿erent ￿ow de￿nitions can be found in the text.
Table 5 lists EE ￿ow rates based on the di￿erent de￿nitions. For comparison, we
also report averages from monthly estimates for the years 1994 and 1995 taken from
Fallick and Fleischman (2004) who use CPS data. As can be seen, identifying EE
movements by employer changes or changes in the occupational code alone yields
roughly comparable ￿ow sizes. However, only our broadest de￿nition of job-to-job
employment transitions comes close to the magnitude found using CPS. In order to
ensure comparability of our results with studies based on CPS data and following the
33arguments made above, we calibrate our model baseline speci￿cation on the 2.51%
based on de￿nition EE3.
B.2 Wages and On the Job Search
We argue in the paper that the magnitude of job-to-job ￿ows in itself is insu￿cient
to evaluate the e￿ciency of on the job search. Instead, the question is how many
of these job changes actually yield higher wages for the worker. In this section, we
demonstrate that about a third of all job-to-job transitions result in lower nominal
wages for the worker. In our model, we interpret these movements as forced ones
which either mask the ￿nding of a new job within notice period after having been
layed-o￿ or represent movements out of non-￿nancial motives such as family reasons.
As Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) point out, these wage cuts might also be the result
of optimizing behavior if the worker expects a steeper wage trajectory at his new
employer. As we demonstrate below, this hypothesis is not borne out by our data.
In addition, the phenomenon turns out robust to all sorts of data strati￿cations.
In the SIPP, respondents are asked, whether they are paid by the hour. If so, the
reported hourly wage is recorded. Otherwise, we obtain hourly wages by dividing
total monthly earnings by hours worked 26. For the present purpose and all subsequent
exercises, we drop any person/month observation for which we cannot determine an
hourly wage. In addition, we drop observations without industry identi￿er, the self-
employed and EE movements which result in the individual holding more than one
job after transiting27. Finally, we exclude the .5 percent most extreme observations
from both ends of the wage growth distribution to get rid of outliers 28.
26For further details see the CEPR SIPP User Notes.
27An individual working two jobs simultaneously may have trouble correctly attributing hours
worked to the di￿erent jobs. This could potentially add noise to the data.
28For nominal log wage changes, this means excluding observations above a change in log wages
of 0.818 and below -0.78.
34B.2.1 Wage Gains from Employment Changes
First, we consider the mean change in log wages after a job to job transition. Our
results depend somewhat on whether we consider nominal or real wage changes.
Of course, the worker should only care about real wages in making his decision.
Meanwhile, an argument can be made that in the presence of some wage rigidity,
the worker expects a real wage loss on his current job as well and therefore compares
nominal wages. Table 6 shows mean nominal and real wage gains for our di￿erent
de￿nitions of job to job movements.
Table 6: Aggregate Changes in Wages after EE
Nominal Real
Ave. change Share loss Ave. loss Ave. change Share loss Ave. loss
EE1 0.0302 0.3420 -0.2522 0.0280 0.5303 -0.1651
EE2 0.0309 0.3618 -0.2503 0.0286 0.5032 -0.1826
EE3 0.0280 0.3337 -0.2353 0.0257 0.5306 -0.1505
EE4 0.0362 0.3908 -0.2815 0.0339 0.4879 ￿-0.2279
Notes: The Table shows statistics concerning wage changes after a job to job transition for real and nominal wages,
respectively. The statistics under consideration are: The average change in log wages, the share of workers incurring
a wage loss, and the average change in log wages, given that the observed change is a loss. We di￿erentiate between
four di￿erent measures of job to job transitions: EE1 identi￿es a job to job transition, if a worker is employed at a
di￿erent ￿rm between two consecutive months. EE2 identi￿es a job to job transition, if the worker’s 3 digit
occupation code changed between two consecutive months. EE3 = EE1 ∪ EE2. EE4 = EE1 ∩ EE2.
Wage gains after a job to job transition average only to about 3 percent. As
shown in Table 6, this is because roughly 35 percent of these transitions actually
yield nominal wage losses. The ￿gure increases to about 51 percent when considering
real wages. Wage losses are not just frequent, they are also sizable. Conditional upon
taking a cut after an EE movement, losses average to 25 percent for nominal and
16 percent for real wages. Reassuringly, these ￿gures are largely invariant to which
de￿nition we use. From now on, all statistics reported will therefore be based on
EE3 only.
We also stratify our sample by di￿erent observable characteristics to show that
35the phenomenon we just described is not driven by a speci￿c population sub group,
but are a key characteristic of the entire labor market. The results are summarized
in Table 7.
Table 7: Share of Wage Cuts after EE Movement in di￿erent subsamples
Nominal Real
Stratify by: Share loss Nr. of Obs. Share loss Nr. of Obs.
Year
1993 0.3277 5971 0.5417 5973
1994 0.3242 5039 0.5206 5038
1995 0.3548 3915 0.5289 3916
Sex
Male 0.3355 8010 0.5271 8011
Female 0.3316 6956 0.5349 6957
Age
16-25 0.3252 4353 0.5064 4354
26-50 0.3394 8992 0.5335 8993
51-70 0.3251 1621 0.5846 1621
Industry
Agriculture 0.3565 172 0.5622 172
Manufacturing 0.3065 4781 0.5080 4782
Trade 0.3512 4383 0.5391 4383
Services 0.3501 1763 0.5727 1764
Government 0.3389 3867 0.5276 3867
Income
Lowest 25% 0.2113 4002 0.4091 3979
25-75% 0.3474 7343 0.5466 7358
Top 25% 0.4479 3621 0.6380 3631
Notes: The Table shows the share of workers incurring a wage cut after a job to job movement, given di￿erent ways
of splitting our sample. The column "Nr. of Obs." shows the number of measured job to job movements in the
speci￿c sub sample. Due to slightly di￿erent outlier identi￿cations, this number does not need to match exactly
between the cases of nominal and real wages.
We ￿rst split our sample into di￿erent years. The willingness of workers to
accept a wage reduction upon transition might depend on the aggregate state of
the economy. In the years 1993 to 1995, the time of our sample, the US economy
36was gradually moving out of the post-Gulf War I recession and unemployment was
steadily falling throughout the sample period. Still, as indicated in the ￿rst panel
of Table 7, there is now discernible time trend in the data. By 1995, unemployment
had reached a historic low but workers still accepted a wage cut when making an EE
movement about one third of the time.
Women are known to have less stable work relationships than men and might
therefore be responsible for an overproportional share of loss making employment to
employment transitions. Nonetheless, in the data both sexes have an equal proba-
bility of experiencing a wage cut after moving. The same holds for strati￿cations
by age groups. Young workers have a loser attachment to the labor market and
may initially experiment with di￿erent career paths or search for jobs with higher
non-monetary bene￿ts. But none of these phenomena cause the youngest age group
to experience markedly more EE transitions with wage losses.
We try out two more relevant data subsets. The ￿rst concerns the industry
the worker moves to. Some industries may o￿er substantial non-monetary bene￿ts
compared to others. Of course, this exercise is not only subject to selection issues, it
is also well-known that wages show industry di￿erentials. In consequence, we should
be expecting to identify industry pairs where wages fall in expectations when moving
from one industry to the other. In order to have su￿ciently many observations for
all subsamples, we group industries into four broad sectors using their three digit
industry codes: Agriculture, Manufacturing, Trade, Private Services, Government.
There are notable di￿erences between sectors. Still, the share of workers incurring a
wage cut after a job to job transition never falls below 30.65 percent.
Lastly, we stratify our sample by earnings. We split the main sample into its
lowest and highest quartile and the observations in between. Again, there is a selec-
tion issue because high wage earners are most likely to incur a loss when they are
forced to look for alternative employment. In a simple employment lottery, where
all workers sample wages from the same random distribution, the probability of in-
curring a wage loss is an increasing function of the current wage. Nonetheless, low
wage earners are far from insulated to wage losses when switching jobs and even in
the lowest quartile, 21 percent of all EE transitions result in nominal wage losses.
37B.2.2 Are Wage Cuts the Result of Optimizing Behavior?
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) o￿er a competing explanation for the occurrence of
wage cuts after EE movements. They lay out a model where wages can only be
renegotiated by mutual agreement and the ￿rm has all the bargaining power. Wage
raises on the job occur as a result of counter-o￿ers to bids by other ￿rms. They
demonstrate that in such a framework workers may accept wage cuts upon job to
job transitions if the option value of working at the other ￿rm is su￿ciently high.
Workers will only move to ￿rms more productive than their current employer and
very productive ￿rms o￿er the potential of large future wage gains.
A testable implication of these types of models is that expected future wage
growth with the new employer should be an increasing function of the wage cut
accepted. As Figure VII demonstrates, it is not borne out by the data. Plotting
initial wage changes against mean average wage growth in the ensuing employment
spell, there appears to be no systematic relationship whatsoever.
Figure VII: Expected Wage Growth as Function of Initial Wage Change
(A) Nominal Wages













































Notes: The Figure plots on the X-axis the initial
change in log nominal wages after a job to job
movement and on the Y-axis the mean monthly wage
growth of the corresponding employment spell. The
correlation coe￿cient between the two statistics is
-0.0839.
(B) Real Wages













































Notes: The Figure plots on the X-axis the initial
change in log real wages after a job to job movement
and on the Y-axis the mean monthly wage growth of
the corresponding employment spell. The correlation
coe￿cient between the two statistics is -0.0827.
38C Consistency of the HKV estimator
In Section 4 we assess the success of our structural model by comparing its results
to reduced form estimates of HKV. However, our analysis implies that a part of the
frictional wage dispersion estimated in HKV is the result of an upward bias. To
understand this point, consider their econometric speci￿cation where they exploit
the panel dimension of the PSID. They regress log wages on worker observables and
recover the residuals of individual i in period t (γit). Frictional wage dispersion is then
measured as ˜ wit = exp(γit−¯ γi), where ¯ γi is the average residual of worker i. This way
the measure controls for both time varying observed and unobserved initial worker
heterogeneity. This speci￿cation only yields an unbiased estimate, if workers’ wages
have no stochastic component that is unobserved by the econometrician. However,
we estimate σǫ = 0.0547, which leads to an upward bias in frictional wage dispersion.
To asses the scale of this problem, we employ their econometric speci￿cation
on our simulated data set. Table 8 displays the implied frictional wage dispersion,
measured at di￿erent percentiles of the frictional wage distribution. In the two cases
considered, the bias is mild. Additionally, in the case of the 1st percentile, the true
degree of wage dispersion is even slightly underpredicted. We therefore conclude that
for the variability of wages present in the data, the results from HKV yield a reliable
estimate of frictional wage dispersion.




Notes: The table displays the simulated mean-min ratios from our baseline model, measured with the econometric
model speci￿ed by Hornstein et al. (2007). The minimum wage is measured as the absolute minimum and at the
1st percentile respectively.
D Numerical Algorithm
The numerical algorithm consists of three nested loops and a simulation afterwards.
39• We begin the algorithm by guessing a labor market tightness θ.
• Next, we guess the wage function over the states for the worker. Discretize
the workers’ log productivity by 1500 grid points. We ￿nd 7.5 to be a non
binding upper bound. Discretize the distribution of log ￿rm productivities by
10 equispaced grid points. The third dimension of the wage function are the
two life-cycle states.
• Given the initial guesses, we can start the inner loop, which calculates the
value functions using value function iteration. Expectations regarding next pe-
riod’s idiosyncratic productivity are calculated using Gaussian quadrature with
10 nodes for evaluating the productivity innovations and spline interpolation
between productivity grid points.
• Taking the value functions of the workers we start the middle loop that updates
the wage function. We compute the value of the ￿rm by Nash-Bargaining:
V J
x (s) = 1−α
α (V E
x (s) − V U
x (s)). Again using Gaussian quadrature and spline
interpolation gives us the expected value of the ￿rm next period. Using this
and the value functions of the workers allows us to compute the policy functions.
• Solving the value of the ￿rm function for wages yields the implied wage schedule
for each grid point (wcomputed). Wages are only determined by Nash-bargaining
in equilibrium. However, worker heterogeneity implies that in equilibrium there
will be certain potential matches whose surplus is negative. In order to be able
to compute meaningful values of employment at these ￿rms we set wages equal
productivity or, put di￿erently, we set the ￿rm value to zero. Afterwards, we
update wages by wnew = ρwinitial +(1−ρ)wcomputed until convergence. ρ is the
updating weight and we ￿nd 0.75 to work ￿ne at the beginning and increase it
to 0.9 towards convergence.
• The last loop computes the implied θ by setting the value of a vacancy to zero.
We therefore need the stationary distributions of the employed and the unem-
ployed. We compute these by distribution function iteration, using the policy
40functions. For the distribution function we a ￿ner grid for worker productivities
of 5000 grid points. Using the results update θ until convergence.
• The last step is the simulation, using the policy functions and equilibrium
job o￿er rates. We use linear inter and extrapolation on the worker and ￿rm
productivity grid29
29We opted for linear interpolation at this step, as it considerably decreases the computational
burden and does not appear to alter the results compared to spline interpolation. Also, spline
extrapolation is known to be unreliable.
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